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Abstract 
 
 
Despite decades of experience with democratic institutions since the end of World War II, the 
quality of Philippine democratic development has been limited, at best. Even the successful 
civil societal mobilization against Ferdinand Marcos neopatrimonial regime did not generate 
a political framework in which an effective state apparatus is capable of backing democratic 
values associated with the formal institutional setting. Why is that the case? This paper 
attempts to answer this question by tracing the regime origins and dynamics of the 
Philippines since the late days of Spanish colonialism. It is argued that what ultimately 
determines institutional changes of contemporary regimes is not so much the age of 
democratization they currently live in, but the historically-grown conflict structures that 
constitute patterns of legimization and delegitimization. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
More than three decades after the beginnings of the third wave of democracy, we currently 
find ourselves in lively debates on contemporary forms of political rule across the world. Two 
sets of questions are at the center of these post-democratization debates. The first set 
involves questions of classifying regimes: how do we define democracy? What characterizes 
autocracies? According to which criteria do we differentiate between regimes? What makes 
more sense, gradual or taxonomical typologies? The second set focuses on the factors 
explaining regime changes: what makes authoritarian regimes deteriorate? Which 
mechanisms are involved in these processes? How do authoritarian regimes legitimize 
themselves and remain durable, if not stable? Is political economy, history, or political culture 
the appropriate framework to study regimes? (Bank 2009; Kailitz 2009; Schlumberger & 
Karadag 2006) 
 
Within these academic debates, the concept of patrimonialism/neopatrimonialism has gained 
renewed attention among scholars trying to make sense of phenomena of systemic 
corruption, informality, weak state institutions, pervasive clientelist and patronage networks 
and cultures of personal-trust-making undermining bureaucratic roles and procedures. 
Originally based on Max Weber’s political sociology, scholars have successfully applied the 
concept across a variety of countries, regions and eras. In this process, the concept traveled 
from describing socio-economic modes of traditionalism to include forms of modern 
domination in which patrimonial and rational-legal forms of legitimacy and practices are 
combined (Eisenstadt 1973). Through this analytical step, the idea of neopatrimonialism was 
made ready to enter the democratic transitions debate, at a time when the notion of 
‘democratic consolidation’ was heavily criticized and the objective was to identify the 
structural sources of failed transitions and classify regimes (Bratton & VandeWalle 1997; 
Hutchcroft 1998) as well as economic orders (Schlumberger 2008; Karadag 2010). 
 
However, in recent years, the concept of neopatrimonialism has been challenged by a new 
wave of studies that attempt to analyze the durability and stability of authoritarian regimes by 
highlighting the impact of formal institutions on political processes, state-society relations and 
contentious politics. While scholars like Helmke & Levitsky (2006) pointed to the informal 
nature of political rule in late developing countries, Brownlee (2007), Gandhi (2008), 
Magaloni (2009), Lust-Okar (2005) and Albrecht (2008) refer to the authoritarian capacities to 
structure the political field for opposition movements and parties and thereby go beyond the 
patrimonial elements of continuous elite reshuffling, personalism, centralized patronage and 
traditional legitimacy that Eisenstadt (1973), Roth (1968), Pawelka (1985) and Bill & 
Springborg (1994) identified as relevant mechanisms of rule. 
 
This paper analyzes the Philippine neopatrimonial regime between 1972 and 1986 under 
President Marcos. Arguing from within the historical-institutionalist framework (cf. Thelen 
1999; Mahoney 2000; Streeck & Thelen 2005; Thelen & Mahoney 2010), the aim is to trace 
the origins of patrimonialism, which can only be understood in relation to the ancien regime 
that emerged with the institutionalization of social power structures in the early years of U.S. 
colonialism (1899-). What was established was an oligarchic regime and a fragmented 
(rather than a cohesive) state apparatus. Within this regime, the state provided only a 
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minimal degree of autonomy and capacities, i.e. of state power as a potentially autonomous 
source of social power to the political elites in power. Political competition was structured 
along the rules of pork barrel and patronage, not of ideological or social cleavages. Also, 
heavily regionalized power structures were established given the way the U.S. 
institutionalized the political process to maintain social order during the ongoing War of 
Resistance (1899-1902). Such are the socio-political origins of 20th century Filipino regimes 
as they have been accounted for with notions of “cacique democracy” (Anderson 2005), 
“booty capitalism” (Hutchcroft 1998), “bossism” (Sidel 1999), “anarchy of families” (McCoy 
1993) and “contested democracy” (Quimpo 2008) to underline the high degrees of continuity 
better explained than in rational choice institutional theories.  
 
However, recently, scholars have opted for a more dynamic historical institutionalist 
approach to account for endogenous institutional changes (Mahoney 2001; Mahoney & 
Thelen 2010; Slater 2010), an idea that is essential to explain Filipino patrimonialism under 
Marcos, how it suspended oligarchy and why, compared to other experiences (e.g. Suharto 
in Indonesia; the Arab World), it was only of relatively short durability. Marcos relied on the 
same strategies, repertoires of authoritarian and patrimonial leaders, as elsewhere: 
centralization, personalism, cronyist allocation of resources, elite recruitment, informality, a 
ruling party, electoral fraud, a nationalist-developmentalist ideology and brute repression 
against liberals, communists, ethnic and religious minorities. Still, his rule longed only for 
fourteen years under authoritarian institutions, after six years as elected president within the 
oligarchic regime. The argument proposed here is that Marcos’ patrimonialism suffered from 
the same problems of state weakness and lacking state power that prevented him to break 
the power of established family business oligarchs and traditional politicians. Due to lacking 
mobilizational resources elite defections accelerated since the early 1980s and prevented the 
possible electoral legitimation of his rule in the snap elections of 1986. As a result, a field 
was created in which liberalizing mechanisms could not be contained by the patrimonial state 
apparatus. 
 
Still, transitions from neopatrimonial rule usually do not end in democratic regimes. Instead, 
the default result is oligarchy, which denotes a set of formally democratic institutions with low 
degrees of state capacities. Liberalizing politics expands the number of players in the new 
regime, but it does not restrain the illiberal practices that are relied on to gain and 
accumulate political (and economic) power. So far, and this holds for the current transitions 
in the Arab world after 2011 as well, there has been no neopatrimonial breakdown that 
increased state power. After decades of systemic, top-down corruption and clientelism, it just 
seems highly unlikely that liberal democracies with a effective law-abiding state can be build 
against such established political practices. Historical institutionalism with its focus on power 
struggles and their reproduction demonstrates the dilemma of establishing post-patrimonial 
capacities to establish democratic rule as the relevant struggles for state power in the 
Philippines have been fought long before Marcos (and presidents after him) came to power 
which heavily constrained the capacities to accomplish just that.  
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2. Regimes, origins and changes 
 
 
What will be presented shortly in this section is an attempt to conceptualize the origin of 
modern regimes as part of a broader historical explanatory tool that may hold for a variety of 
late developing countries. This will be done through the framework of historical 
institutionalism, a framework that has for too long been charged of mainly being able to 
describe patterns of durability and continuity. 
 
First, what are regimes? They are defined here as fields of contestation in which individual 
and collective actors compete for gaining, maintaining and maximizing political power. This 
field is structured by rules specifying the modes of gaining, exerting and losing power, who 
can participate and the range of political power, its material and normative resources. 
Political power, the capacity to make and enforce collectively-binding decisions, is aimed at 
and operates through the state, in Weberian terms the “human community that (successfully) 
claims the monopoly of legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”  
 
Through this very broad definition of regimes, we include the notion of institutions, i.e. those 
rules specifying the rules of the game, rules that are enforced and guarded and which 
ultimately represent “distributional instruments laden with power implications.” (Mahoney & 
Thelen 2010: 8) Based on these definitional propositions, we may start differentiating 
between regime types, e.g. the original democracy, authoritarianism, totalitarianism and the 
recent democracy, hybrid regime, authoritarianism divides. Within these typologies, 
patrimonialism/neopatrimonialism is a subtype of authoritarian regimes, in which no effective 
competition for relevant decision-making offices takes place, civil rights and political liberties 
and the mechanisms of participation are inhibited. 
 
Regimes, and the institutions through which they operate, are “enduring legacies of power 
struggles” (Thelen 1999: 388), legacies that have a lasting impact on actors’ practices 
reproducing them in the ongoing struggles for political power.1 These legacies result from the 
fact that at one point in time, there crystallized a certain solution and institutionalization of 
existing power relations that, in the highly technical language of path dependency, came with 
a lock-in effect and self-reinforcing stabilization of this institutional outcome. However, this 
pattern only reflects one possible path after the critical juncture. Another possibility, to 
account for change mechanisms, is James Mahoney’s ‘reactive sequence’ model according 
                                                 
1 This power-oriented view on institutions clearly breaks with rational choice and New Institutional 
Economics assumptions. In the words of Claus Offe “the origin of institutions must be looked for not 
in terms of purposive rational and deontological terms […]. Institutions and institutional changes are 
more consistently explained in terms of the balance of social power that they reflect rather than in 
terms of the goals and objectives that they are claimed to serve.” (2006: 12) In an similar vein, Moe 
alludes to the necessary differentiation between ‘governance structures’ and ‘political systems’: 
“Governance structures are relational contracts in which actors agree to procedures that allow 
them to adjudicate disputes, adjust to new developments, and otherwise ensure that their original 
agreement is maintained over time in a changing environment. […] What makes such stylized 
governance structures different from political systems, however, is that they are voluntary. Political 
systems are different. Centuries of political philosophy notwithstanding, there is no social contract 
in any meaningful sense that can account for the foundations of government. In all modern 
societies, people are typically born into the formal structure of their political system, do not agree to 
it from the onset, and cannot leave if they find it disadvantageous (unless they leave their country).” 
(2006: 40-41) 
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to which what matters is the mobilization of actors and groups against the institutionalized 
outcome (Mahoney 2000; 2001).2 In their search for further modes of endogenous 
institutional changes, Streeck & Thelen (2005) and Mahoney & Thelen (2010) have 
conceptualized a variety of change mechanisms (layering, drift, displacement, conversion) 
that may be gradual but still trigger revolutionary changes in the long run. 
 
Besides this distributional dimension that creates boundaries in the political field between 
incumbents, challengers, outsiders and beneficiaries, what matters for the maintenance of a 
regime are the actual practices of relevant political actors and the way these practices are 
regularized and confirm of oppose the material and/or normative pillars of the regime’s 
institutional framework. As Tilly & Tarrow noted, each regime consists of “regular relations 
among governments, established political actors, challengers, and outside political actors, 
including other governments” (2006: 45), where in each regime, there exists an 
acknowledged set of repertoires political actors may resort to. Shaped by former power 
struggles, meaning systems and cultural representations, new repertoires enter the field 
through creative actions of relevant political figures, actions that may be emulated and that 
may thereby, although it can differ from the rules of the game, change the face of the 
respective regime (Migdal 2001). 
 
The introduction of new repertoires of action by political elites makes sense only by relating 
them to the same social struggles that gave birth to the respective regime in a particular 
country. They create new meaning systems and legitimize themselves by articulating the 
legitimacy gaps of the existing political, socio-economic and cultural orders and the 
contradictions arising from the uncovered gaps between ‘images’ and ‘practices’ linked to 
them. It is argued in this paper that the origin of regimes and their persistent contradictions is 
to be traced back to the great transformations taking place in the nineteenth century, when 
the expansion of capitalist social relations, the erosion of liberalism and the creation of new 
nationalist identities undermine colonial and imperialist orders in the global periphery. In the 
Philippine case, these forces weaken Spanish colonial institutions and create sites of 
contention that are then determined by the entry of the newly rising U.S. colonial empire 
which established formally democratic and decentralizing institutions which consolidated the 
political power of agrarian oligarchs. After this ‘critical juncture’, the continual non-democratic 
exclusion of rival social groups from the arena of contestation represented the predominant 
legitimacy flaw in the Philippines, a flaw to be later instrumentalized by figures like Marcos in 
his attempt to create the ‘New Society’.    
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Through the reactive sequence, Mahoney (2001) presents a more complex picture of the longue 
durée legacies of liberalism in Central America in which each early institutional framework faced 
particular opposing pressures, the reinforcing path was broken, and a variety of long-term 
outcomes is portrayed. See Karadag (2010) for the adoption of this historical model to explain path 
ruptures in Turkey and the Philippines. 
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3. State formation and regime origins in the Philippines 
 
 
In this section, I will briefly highlight the historically-grown regime patterns that were shaped 
by three factors: Spanish colonialism, the impact of capitalist transformations and the 
institutional outcome enforced and guarded by the new U.S. colonial power at the turn of the 
20th century. We will see that within the new oligarchic regime, there existed a dynamic 
tendency toward the centralization of political power as it was first successfully realized by 
Manuel Quezon, first President of the Philippine Commonwealth (1935-1941), whose 
strategies of electoral manipulation, repression, bossism and party patronage represents the 
blueprint for all later, including Marcos’, patrimonial experiments that were increasingly being 
institutionally contained. 
 
 
3.1 Spanish colonialism and capitalist transformations 
 
Before the Spanish conquest, the Philippine archipelago consisted of a multitude of socio-
cultural localities. In general, settlements were usually to be found along rivers and the 
coasts the latter of which developed trading relations with foreign, Asian and Arab, but mostly 
Chinese, traders. Within these settlements (baranguays), the social organization was divided 
along three separate strata. Datus formed a distinctive type of hereditary nobility that had 
political, military, juridical and economic roles. Distinguished by charisma and traditional 
animistic practices (through the use of magical items), datus attained military capacities and 
economic wealth through which they could sustain their own power bases that could be 
measured by the number of dependent households. The common people (tao) paid tributes 
and were linked to them through bonds of servitude (either after committing crimes and being 
convicted or through economic indebtedness). These forms of servitude, however, were not 
of a strict juridical nature and would not prevent upward mobility, given the specific conditions 
of mutual interdependence. In-between datus and tao were the maharlika (timawa in the 
Visayan Islands), a kind of warrior nobility that belonged to the datus’ households and acted 
as their entourages in war and in public ceremonies. While they usually did not labor and 
were exempt from paying tribute, in the Tagalog-speaking regions, lower-standing timawa 
performed agricultural labor for the datus.3 
 
What was particular about Spanish colonialism in the Philippine archipelago was its mixture 
of military and missionary activities. While it took Spain several decades to establish its hold 
over Cebu, Luzon and the Visayas (Mindanao would only come under effective Spanish 
control in the second half of the 19th century), the lack of Spanish personnel induced the 
empire to set up local authorities with the help of local chieftains and Catholic friar orders 
                                                 
3 “For several reasons, baranguay social stratification escaped rigidity. The delicate web of linkages 
which bound the community together blurred any tendencies toward caste. Landholding 
arrangements differed sufficiently to assure a gradual rise and fall of individual fortunes. Complex 
marital patterns, together with intricate social gradations growing out of them, alleviated the long-
term impact of status. Women also occupied elevated positions and constantly influenced their 
offspring’s destination through gentle or shrewish treatment of husbands and male relatives. The 
system, in brief, functioned in accord with tribal dynamics. Its relatively simple forms bore little or no 
resemblance to European corporate and contractual configurations.” (Sturtevant 1976: 23-24; 
emphasis in original) 
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who quite early sent their missionaries into most parts of the archipelago. These friars 
(Augustinians, Franciscans, Dominicans and – with interruptions – Jesuits) were highly 
effective in their activities by incorporating local animistic cults (e.g. the replacement of 
magical items through Catholic icons and symbols), thereby appropriating the rule of 
shamans who before acted as intermediaries towards spiritual sources (Stanley 1974: 17). 
Furthermore, the Spanish could also instrumentalize the already existing social stratification 
for their purposes. They depended on the cooperation of datus who would help in the 
reducción process in order to uphold their privileged status. They were assigned cabezas de 
baranguay or gobernadorcillos, collected tributes for the colonial state, while they themselves 
were exempt from paying. This strategy upheld and both transformed the pre-colonial social 
and political setting, with the former datus now forming the principalia (Simbulan 2005).4 
 
For several centuries under Spanish rule, the Philippine archipelago was serving mainly as 
entrepôt in the famous galleon trade and as a source for tribute payments to the Spanish 
crown. The institutional framework that secured these economic activities strengthened the 
role of the Spanish friars who controlled non-expansive commercial agriculture oriented 
toward local markets. Two related factors set the shift in motion toward a capitalist, export-
oriented economic order, the first one being the official plan of Governor-General Basco y 
Vargas (1778-1787), and the second one being the influence of western capital that – 
combined with the ongoing internal dynamics of the rise of indio and mestizo landowning 
classes – created a new, unified peripheral economy based on export cash crop agriculture 
and the opening of the archipelago into the world economic system (Corpuz 1997). 
 
During the first half of the nineteenth century, Philippine agricultural exports rose 
continuously to levels unseen before. With the independence of Spain’s Latin American 
territories, the already unprofitable galleon trade came to an end (between 1815 and 1821). 
The forces that spurred these new economic developments were British and U.S. trading and 
financial houses who directed investments into cash crop agriculture. Increasingly, lands and 
forests were cleared for new plantations, so that export crops (sugar, abaca, indigo, coconut, 
coffee) became the most profitable products to cultivate. Rice, as the traditionally main 
product in the subsistence economy and for tribute payments in kind (in 1830, only three 
provinces left for tribute in kind), had to give way in the course of the monetarization of the 
economy. Also, individual British, U.S., French and Spanish entrepreneurs came to the 
Philippines as commercial agents and invested in these areas, most prominently in the sugar 
industry (Larkin 1993; Billig 2003) Even though the international price for sugar was 
decreasing continuously until World War I, the Philippine sugar industry formed the politico-
economic bloc that would dominate power relations until the post-colonial era. Also, in this 
sector, we see a highly differentiated division of labor between western financial houses and 
entrepreneurs, mestizo landowners and Chinese middlemen. The latter, since the latest 
immigration waves, were initially thought to contribute to the promotion of the industry as 
rural workers. Instead, they regained their privileged positions as commercial agents, 
retailers, provisioners of the urban centers and as tax collectors, pushing the mestizos into 
                                                 
4 “Preserved in at least some measure of their traditional role, the principalía had a strong interest in 
maintaining the status quo and were in no sense a challenge to the priests. An element of 
continuity, they mediated between the Spanish and a population too large and diffuse to be 
governed directly.” (Stanley 1974: 14) 
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landholding and commercial agriculture5, while western financial houses were mainly 
focusing on exporting the crops to Britain, the U.S., and, to a minor extent, to Spain (Legarda 
1999; Wickberg 1965). 
 
Similar to Europe and other regions, a capitalist and landowning class emerged through 
practices of dispossession and the commodification of labor. While bonds of reciprocity tied 
landowners to tenants and rural laborers, under the new economic order, money turned into 
the overarching source of social status. With the increased monetarization of the economy, 
peasants kept falling into debt traps and decreased in their social position. The money nexus 
set up more rigid hierarchies and boundaries, leaving to them the choice between fleeing the 
land or rebelling against friars and landholders. 
 
In political terms, the Spanish colonial order was challenged by several factors: new claims 
made by new rural and urban elites for political participation according to the predominant 
global scripts of liberalism which had triggered conflicts between liberals and conservatives 
in Spain; reforms in the field of education that opened a new avenue of “social advancement” 
(Abinales & Amoroso 2005: 92); and the beginnings of new nationalist identities that 
radicalized the opposition against the Crown as it became obvious that the struggle of 
Spanish liberals did not include the interests of ilustrado elites for self-representation. 
 
Who were the propagators of the Filipino nation, and what claims were made? Urban elites 
and professionals, western-educated intellectuals and agrarian expressed their interests in 
substantive political reforms, most influential of which was José Rizal.6 They actively 
participated in debates with their liberal allies at home and in Spain, writing books and 
pamphlets. The first organized group called itself La Solidaridad in 1889 and was active in 
Spain. At the beginning, claims hovered mainly around issues of equality and changing the 
Philippine status from colony into a Spanish province. For a long time, the „propagandists‟ 
(Schumacher 1991) did not desire independence from Spain, but rather called for an end of 
friar power in the archipelago. It was only later, with the escalation of political struggles in the 
mid-1890s that national independence developed into a tangible concept worth fighting for as 
it became clearer every year that the reformist path would not bear any tangible fruits. The 
fact that reforms, and not revolution, was the desired goal may also reflect the ilustrado 
backgrounds of the propagandists. Most of these actors belonged to the new upper classes, 
with backgrounds in commercial agriculture, urban professions. These groups called for the 
establishment of political institutions in which they would exert privileged positions as the 
arbitrators between the Spanish and the Filipino nation, through rebuilding the solidarity 
                                                 
5 “For the most part it was the Chinese who facilitated the commodification of agriculture, but it was 
the mestizos who capitalized on the increasing value of land and thus became a landed elite 
holding key offices in rural Luzon.” (Wilson 2004: 51; emphasis in original) 
6 José Rizal, born in 1861, was to become the ideological father of the revolutionary uprisings of the 
Filipinos in 1896 against Spain and in 1899 against the USA. During his studies at various 
universities in Europe, he gained fame and popularity back at home by his two novels, Noli Me 
Tangere (1887) and El Filibusterismo (1891) which captured the sufferings of the Filipino at the 
hands of colonial authorities and friar orders while at the same time constructing the ethnic Chinese 
as alien to the Filipino nation (Hau 2000: 142). In Europe, he worked together with other 
Propagandists (especially Marcelo del Pilar) in lobbying for political reforms, equality and 
assimilation of the Philippines into the Spanish Empire. However, he would break with del Pilar’s 
assimilationist stand and upon his return to the Philippines create his own organization, La Liga 
Filipina, through which to promote reform back at home. 
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linkages between the mother country and the new nation which the Crown and the friars 
have for too long disrupted. 
 
While Rizal was exiled to Mindanao, other nationalist actors created the Katipunan, a secret 
society that was planning armed uprisings against the Spaniards. Rizal himself cautioned 
against violent actions, deeming such attempt to be preliminary. Even so, his stand and 
treatment by the colonial authorities provided mobilizational resources for the members of 
the radically-minded Katipunan under Andrès Bonifacio. As the Spanish were on the verge of 
preemptively striking against the organization, Bonifacio proclaimed the uprising on 24 
August 1896, four months before Rizal was executed by the Spanish as he was charged with 
leading the rebellion. 
 
 
3.2 US colonialism 
 
While the Katipuneros faced enormous challenges against the Spanish troops, in 1898, the 
revolutionary cause took an unexpected turn with the breakout of the U.S.-Spanish War on 
April 24. While the primary reason for the war was linked to the rebellion in the Cuban colony 
and the opportunity of the U.S. to get rid of the Spanish in their newly defined domains, the 
U.S. sent naval troops to the Philippines. After an easy and decisive victory in Manila bay on 
1 May under Admiral Dewey, Filipino forces tried to use the occasion and, with more or less 
coordination with U.S. troops, further liberalized several cities and provinces. Yet, the U.S. 
entry also stirred much unrest and uncertainty among the Katipuneros as to the actual goals 
of the U.S. in Southeast Asia. Aguinaldo, the new leader of the Katipunan since 1899, would 
not succeed in being recognized formally (despite the declaration of independence on 12 
June 1899) by the U.S. who rather started their peace negotiations with Spain under the 
condition that the Katipunan would not be legitimized. With more and more U.S. troops in the 
country (and Manila in August 1898), frictions between them and Filipino resistance fighters 
were becoming increasingly unavoidable (cf. Miller 1984: Chap. Three). 
 
The treaty of Paris in December 1898 finally outlined the goals of the new empire. According 
to the treaty, Spain lost all its remaining colonies. While Cuba would be granted formal 
independence, Puerto Rico and the Philippines would fall under the authority of the USA. Still 
reckoning that the anti-imperialist positions in Congress would prevent the ratification of the 
treaty, Aguinaldo started to implement his own state-building visions and on January 23, 
1899, proclaimed the Republic of Malolos. In the framework of this first Asian republic, the 
power of landed elites and urban ilustrados was to be institutionalized elites through 
controlled political participation (Abinales & Amoroso 2005: 113). Simultaneously, the U.S. 
sent the first Philippine Commission under Cornell University president Jacob Gould 
Schurman to assess the necessities and possibilities of U.S. rule. In midst of these 
preparations on both sides, open fights erupted between U.S. troops and Filipinos in Manila 
in early February, paving the way for the second war of independence on 4 February 1899 
(Miller 1982: 63), a war that was won by the Americans within three years through a mixture 
of military operations, political cooptation of urban and rural elites and massive dislocations 
that destroyed the social bases of the resistance, which directly and indirectly caused the 
death of quarter a million natives (Corpuz 1997: 205-206). 
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In their proclaimed goal of democratic tutelage, the Americans set up a central administrative 
apparatus under the appointed Governor-General which was restricted for colonial officials 
(Executive Bureau, Bureau of Audits, Department of Interior, Department of Commerce and 
Police, Department of Finance and Justice, Department of Public Instruction, Bureau of 
Agriculture). The Executive Bureau, as laid out in the Civil Service Act in 1901, was designed 
to centralize the investigative and monitoring capacities of the boards, thereby marking the 
locus of bureaucratic rationality of the new administration. In fact, the Bureau adhered to 
these goals and made use of its capacities to curb abusive behavior, both by American 
(1902-03, 17 charged and sent to prison) as well as by Filipino officials (1903-1913, 2300 
cases leading to 1500 penalties). At the same time, native actors were to be included 
through limited representative institutions. Starting at the provincial and regional levels with 
elections that took place during the war, these cooptation measures culminated in national 
elections and the establishment of the Philippine Assembly in which the first generation of 
national Filipino elites came together. 
 
How did this form of political institutionalization and representation relate to the other pillar of 
social engineering, the administrative capacities of the colonial bureaucracy? Frankly, it 
directly opposed it. These administrative powers were undermined by the political rues of 
patronage and power, to which American politicians of the high era of U.S. machine politics 
were well-accustomed.7 Governor-General Taft and the Philippine Commission were 
confronted with a dilemma of having to choose between bureaucratic rationality and 
impartiality and political control through cooperation with local elites. They chose the latter to 
“reinforce the power of the indigenous elites rather than to sow the seeds of popular 
government” (May 1980: 42).8 Even though the Americans criticized and open attacked 
forms of ‘caciquismo’ as remnants of the Spanish era, their own mode of state-building in 
terms of bureaucratic rationality became a “monumental failure” (Hutchcroft 2000: 288). For, 
U.S. officials themselves played along patronage rules to uphold authority. Similar to the 
Spanish before them, the U.S. lacked the will of the capacities, given these contradictory 
goals, to counter corrupt practices and the hegemony of the national oligarchy which rested 
upon local bossism. With the inauguration of the PA, the Nacionalistas were effective in 
deepening, despite last-minute measures of the PC to control such capacities, the 
Filipinization of bureaucracy and politics. One such measure was the reform of the Civil 
Service Act in 1908 according to which municipal treasurers were to be appointed by the 
                                                 
7 See Abinales (2003) on the similarity of discourses and problems between machine politics and 
progressivism in the U.S. and the Philippines; also May (1980) on the social conservative 
background of the members of the PC, Paredes (1988b) on Taft’s strategy of shifting patronage 
resources from the Federalistas to the Quezon and Osmeña factions. The best account of these 
early patronage structures is Cullinane (1989) who outlines in detail the decline of the Federalistas 
in terms of patronage capacities. 
8 “From the outset the interaction between these aspiring political elites and the Americans was one 
of give and take: Americans sought peace and order and acquiescence to their major political and 
economic policies for the colony; Filipino elites sought security for their social and economic 
positions in the indigenous society and a greater share in running the colony. In the exchange, 
Filipinos succeeded very early in obtaining considerable control over local politics and government. 
What they gave up in national sovereignty and long-term economic and cultural subordination, they 
gained in local autonomy and, by 1907, the ability to ensconce themselves in key national-level 
positions (seats in the national legislative assembly and high bureaucratic offices). By this time they 
had both consolidated their positions in the colonial government and established political 
mechanisms and relationships that permitted them in most cases to avoid colonial scrutiny.” 
(Cullinane 2009: 69) 
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municipal councils, an act that “removed one of the most important local posts from civil 
service protection and transformed it into an explicitly political post.” (Hutchcroft 2000: 291) 
 
Although these power constellations were structured in a bottom-up way marked by high 
degrees of political fragmentation due to the absence of cohesive national elites, there was 
indeed room for maneuver for political actors to accumulate wealth and power. The newly 
validated rules of patronage (Go 2008) were a strong obstacle to political cohesion. There 
existed no ideological or organizational basis for it, and although the prevalent power-sharing 
institutions (between the Philippine Assembly, the Senate, the U.S. Governor-General, and 
the local and regional assemblies) reflected this fragmentation, the case of Manuel Quezon, 
the political champion of his time, underlined the dynamics toward centralization and 
‘patrimonialization’ inherent in the oligarchic regime. These dynamics did not translate into a 
full-fledged patrimonial regime only because of the Japanese invasion in 1942, Quezon’s 
flight into exile, and the proclamation of the new Republic. 
 
What were the new repertoires of political elites? And how did Quezon change these in such 
a way that allowed him to acquire such a powerful position unforeseen by the colonial and 
Commonwealth institutions? 
 
First, Quezon stood at the head of and steered the Filipinization process. As leader of the PN 
and President of the Senate, he controlled the allocation of loans of the Philippine National 
Bank (PNB)  in exchange of donations from wealthy businessmen, sugar barons and 
bankiers, thereby successfully entrenching himself as the essential broker of scarce financial 
resources.9 Turning the PNB into a vat patronage source, he successfully outcompeted 
rivals, coopted and bought others, while signaling to the rest that all success, political and 
financial, depended on having good relations with him. 
 
Second, Quezon excelled in and superseded other elites in his engagement in local politics. 
More so than earlier Manila-based elites (e.g. the Federalistas in the 1900s), he actively 
incorporated local affairs under the Nacionalista umbrella. Interested in containing conflicts 
between rivaling local and regional factions, Quezon did not hesitate to strain the financial 
resources of the bureaucracy and the party and to use brute force to punish competitors. 
 
Third, and maybe most important in this colonial setting, since his time as residential 
commissioner in Washington D.C., Quezon could rely on his support networks within the 
Congress and the State Department by effectively signaling that the problem of maintaining 
colonial social order could only be solved by him. While his policies and extra-legal measures 
met with heavy criticism from the Governor-General, relations with U.S. political elites were 
usually quite good so that, effectively, the ‘democratic’ framework the U.S. officials set up did 
                                                 
9 “Quezon’s wealthy backers were lavish in their support. Andres Soriano of San Miguel Corporation 
extended Quezon a ₱ 65,000 ‘loan’ and Joaquin Elizalde of Elizalde y Cia ₱ 45,000 on similarly 
generous terms. The Philippine Sugar Association contributed amounts of up to ₱ 50,000 to the 
Party regularly during the 1930s. Inidividual planters with large crop loans from the Philippine 
National Bank were expected to make regular contributions to Quezon’s wing of the Nacionalista 
Party as well. When PNB debtors contributed only ₱ 20,000 in July and August 1940, for example, 
Nacionalista leaders considered this a ‘poor showing’ and suggested that ‘Quezon exert pressure 
on the heavier debtors of the bank for more substantial donations.’ And pressure he did.” (McCoy 
1988: 134) 
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not represent any realistic obstacle to measures of power maximization that breached the 
existing institutions. Subsequently, with these vast power resources at hand, Quezon did not 
plan to recede from the Commonwealth Presidency and exerted enormous political pressure 
to change the Commonwealth constitution, measures that only came to a halt with the 
Japanese invasion and Quezon’s death in 1944.  
 
 
3.3 The post-independence regime 
 
Despite the similarity of the political institutional framework of the new independent Philippine 
Republic in 1946 and the continuity of political personnel (as almost none of the collaborators 
with Japan were charged), new structural features shaped the rules of political patronage. 
First, the hegemonial status of the PN disintegrated in the course of World War II and the 
Liberal Party (LP), although not distinguishable from the PN concerning socio-economic 
background and policy orientation, emerged as a rival political machine. Second, the Huk 
rebellion in the late 1940s was a major social force as it had gained had gained countrywide 
social control during the war and was capable to lead, at least in Luzon, a near civil war as it 
was barred from the political stage in 1946. Third, and most important, in 1949 the regime 
would for the first time enact policy changes toward import substitution industrialization that 
strengthened the potential autonomy of the state. However, these instruments merely served 
to centralize patronage resources in the hands of the President who could arbitrarily direct 
resources to economic elites. 
 
After the decisive steps for institutional and economic reconstruction were passed in 1946, 
the political game resumed where it had been interrupted by the war. However, Roxas’ 
candidacy under the new Liberal Party (LP) label and his victory over Osmeña (with the 
financial support of General McArthur) signaled one important shift, the transition to multi-
party politics, the further decentralization of political power structures; in short, the end of 
quasi-patrimonial rule as intended by Quezon. It turned out, though, that the extension of 
political contestation did not lead to the realization of democratic practices and public 
accountability. Both the PN and the LP remained mere patronage machines and were not 
distinguishable in terms of ideology and social background (Landé 1964; Franco 2001; 
Thompson 1995). Turncoatism was a standard practice depending on personal rivalries, and 
elections became a highly expensive way of guaranteeing control, as patronage allocation, 
not ideological disputes, decided over victory or failure. Accordingly, the elections of 1949, in 
which Quirino (who assumed office after Roxas’ fatal heart attack in 1948) rigged the 
electoral outcome, as of 1957, with Carlos Garcia maintaining the presidency, almost brought 
the country to the verge of bankruptcy. Furthermore, there were no mechanisms 
guaranteeing that candidates even tried to make the outcome look like a clean affair. So, 
while pre-war elections were similarly certain in outcome because of the patronage 
hegemony of the PN, the heightened and fierce competition after the war opened political 
institutions for newcomers as financial contributions were essential resources, no matter from 
whom. Factionalism was blossoming, limiting the state’s infrastructural power and continually 
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overburdening the treasury, even against the resistance of free election movements (cf. 
Hedman 2006).10 
 
 
 
4. Oligarchic decay and Marcos’ temporary neopatrimonialism 
 
 
In the aftermath of Ferdinand Marcos’ election to President in 1965, the Filipino oligarchy 
underwent substantive transformations, both in politics and the economy. Faced with the 
predominance of traditional families in Congress, on the one hand, and mounting social 
pressures for change, Communist and Mindanao separatists, on the other hand, Marcos 
successfully resorted to new forms of mobilization and patronage that disrupted the 
institutional setting. With his new prerogatives as authoritarian ruler after 1972, Marcos relied 
on the Church, the military, technocrats and new middle classes to whom he promised an 
end of the decaying features of the country’s backward-oriented oligarchy. By abolishing 
political competition, Marcos could indeed vest more powers into the state apparatus to an 
extent unseen in Filipino history. 
 
However, contrary to the proclaimed attempts to end oligarchic rule and to create a ‘New 
Society’, Marcos, and his wife Imelda, continued to rely on the principles of political business 
and patrimonial plunder.  In spite of the fact that they brought order and certainty into the 
political arena, their strategies of monopolizing patronage resources in a highly arbitrary 
manner simultaneously undermined this certainty. Through divide-and-rule tactics, he 
punished rivaling families, promoted established and created new family riches. 
 
 
4.1 Breakdown of oligarchy 
 
Marcos’ first presidential election victory displayed the usual features of Philippine political 
contestation. Formerly being member of the incumbent LP, Marcos defected to run for 
presidency under the Nacionalista banner to render his commitment to change more credible 
and to distance himself from the widely-perceived corruption of the Garcia (1957-61) and 
Macapagal (1961-1965) years. His successful re-election, though, indicated that something 
bigger was going on in the political process. Winning clearly against Sergio Osmeña Jr. and 
gaining overwhelming majorities in Congress, Marcos seems to have been among the first 
Filipino politicians to realize those changing opportunities. 
 
The broader range of political opportunities emerged due to the social and ideological 
transformations after almost twenty years of import substituting industrialization. 
Theoretically, the executive disposed of selective allocation capacities to counter established 
political families. Also, the President enjoyed relatively higher degrees of autonomy from 
business actors given the emerging rivalries between different factions of capital (industrial 
vs. agrarian) and the decreasing cohesiveness of the sugar bloc, even though the 
                                                 
10 See Kang (2002: 127) and Thompson (1995: 35) for the direct link between years of elections and 
the overburdening of the budget. See also Sidel (1999: 64-65, 89) for the link between national 
contestation and local boss structures in Cavite and Cebu, respectively. 
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diversification patterns eased those tensions to a certain extent and safeguarded the families 
against new political intrusions.11 
 
What explains the lower importance of traditional agrarian elites? As the sugar industry was 
in shambles after World War II, a whole series of new centrals was built which at that time 
was mainly financed by foreign capital and which were more geographically dispersed 
(Hawes 1987: 93). Most important, however, higher degrees of urbanization transferred the 
essential sources for political survival, i.e. votes, into the cities, marking a process that called 
for new types of patronage allocation. Before, rural local bosses tied to the landowning elites, 
through force and favors, operated effectively for the respective party machine. Now, political 
parties had to focus on the urban social landscape. Doing this, new spaces for societal and 
political mobilization emerged because of the persistent high degrees of social inequality, 
urban unemployment and middle-class disappointment with the unbroken corrupt practices of 
officials and politicians. A process of radicalization began, with new political groups on the 
stage who radically tried to alter the political rules of the game. 
 
In these urban milieus, especially in Manila, parallel to leftist movements around the world, 
the main groups opting for radical change were students (Nationalist Youth), middle-class 
intellectuals, former Huks, Social Democrats and members of the PKP. Opposing the quasi-
feudal nature of Filipino capitalism and the neo-colonial state of the country (as one of the 
most important regional supporters of the U.S. Vietnam war), they partly acted in continuity to 
earlier protest movements. They uncovered the long-lasting legitimacy gaps of the national 
elites and openly broke with the reformist path of the PKP and other parties working through 
the institutional framework. Thus, in 1969, José Maria Sison split from the PKP and founded 
the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), which adhered to Maoist tactics and 
established its own military wing (New People’s Army, NPA) to stir rural rebellion which has 
lasted until today (Kessler 1989; Weekley 2001; Quimpo 2008). 
 
Still, similar claims were also made by Marcos himself who tried to distinguish himself from 
traditional forms of oligarchic plunder and decay. In line with the political philosophy of the 
Katipuñero revolutionary Apolinario Mabini (Steinberg 2000: 122), Marcos articulated the 
necessity of a strong and cohesive state through which to counter agrarian oligarchs and to 
promote industrial development autonomously from neo-imperialist capital. For the time 
being, Marcos had nothing to fear from the new CPP-NPA group because it was 
organizationally undermanned and had only few linkages to urban working classes and 
professionals (Weekley 2001). But, beginning in 1970, shortly after his re-election and 
inauguration in which he “outgunned, outgooned, and outgolded” his rivals, radical student 
groups intensified their anti-Marcos demonstrations in Manila. Marcos turned to open 
repression in what was called the First Quarter Storm, for which Marcos blamed trapos 
cooperating with the CPP-NPA (Thompson 1995: 40). 
 
                                                 
11 “There is one other reason for diversification […]: in an economy in which wealth depends to such 
a large degree on access to the state machinery, diversification helps to guard against the 
uncertainties of change in political leadership. A family cannot depend exclusively on investments 
assisted by current friends in the Palace, for example, because in the next administration those 
investments may be jeopardized by a lack of necessary connections in key government offices.” 
(Hutchcroft 1991: 427; emphasis in original) 
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Early afterwards, activities spread to urban labor groups as well, mostly due to the increasing 
inflationary pressures, which resulted from an IMF agreement for further devaluating the 
peso after new balance-of-payment problems. Strikes were increasing in numbers in these 
years, but even these protests could be contained by the regime. The ultimate justification for 
the suspension of civil rights (e.g. the habeas corpus writ in 1971) and the declaration of 
martial law arose from the wave of terrorist bomb attacks in 1971 and 1972. On August 21, 
1971, a bomb attack on a LP rally for the midterm senatorial and municipal elections left 9 
people dead and close to 100 wounded (Thompson 1995: 44). With no sufficient proof, LP 
members, student activists and media companies belonging to traditional politicians openly 
held Marcos responsible for the attack. LP victories in the elections, ongoing urban terror, the 
intensification of the insurgence in Mindanao by the recently-formed Moro National Liberation 
Front (MNLF)12, and the failure of the president to alter the constitution (through the 
Constitutional Convention in 1971) that would have allowed him to run for a third term under 
a parliamentary regime, served as background factors for the declaration of martial law in 
1972. The final trigger for this step was the staged assassination attempt on Secretary of 
Defense, Juan Ponce Enrile (Thompson 1995: 46). 
 
Thus, the oligarchic regime eventually broke down, not by, as many elite members has 
feared, communist uprisings, but by a president riding on the fears of anarchic breakdown 
and unwilling to abide to the rules of political turnover. Oligarchic power had to face severe 
legitimacy gaps which were interpreted both by anti-systemic movements and by Marcos as 
problems inherent to the concept of ‘oligarchy’.13 There is an internal dynamism in 
oligarchies power constellations that arise from high degrees of political and economic power 
concentration and high degrees of social inequality and political exclusion. On the one hand, 
rulers are thus tempted to extend their capacities vis-à-vis traditional politicians through 
mobilizing the discontented. On the other hand, elite actors favor an authoritarian ruler 
guaranteeing their elite status to a deepening of political liberalization. Social change, 
urbanization and political radicalization provided such opportunities. 
 
 
4.2 Authoritarian powers 
 
One other important mechanism through which Marcos effected political centralization was 
his own use of patronage channels. In the highly competitive post-war regime, pork barrel 
was allocated to representatives and through them trickled down to their constituencies for 
projects in rural development, public infrastructure, schools, hospitals and housing.14 Marcos 
                                                 
12 Here, too, Marcos’ repressive tactics themselves radicalized the conflict, especially after the 
Jabidah massacre in 1968; see Abinales (2000: 166). 
13 “Masking his power grab in the language of reform, Marcos claimed that he declared martial law to 
save Philippine society from the extreme left and extreme right elements he portrayed to be 
threatening the political order. He declared himself to be leading a ‘democratic revolution’ where 
the political center would meet the threats from the left and the right. He promised to establish a 
‘New Society’. The ‘democratic revolution’ of the ‘New Society’ would also consist in breaking the 
privileges of the traditional oligarchy and would initiate what he termed to be the ‘democratization of 
wealth.’” (Manapat 1991: 84) 
14 Also, as national leaders before and after him, Marcos relied on brute force, on the one hand, and 
on targeting regional power brokers, bosses, who supported his rivals. One prominent example of 
the implications of political centralization on the provincial level was the downfall of Justiniano 
Montano, Sr., who has ‘ruled’ the Cavite region since the 1930s, being engaged in landholding and 
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re-election was accompanied by excessive patronage measures relative to the usual amount 
of public resources spent. The 1969 elections thus turned into the most expansive election 
campaign in Filipino history, amounting to 250 million dollars which contributed (as did 
Quirino’s victory in 1949) to the necessity of an IMF agreement which forced him to 
devaluate the peso.  
 
Also, Marcos began politicizing the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). He enlarged the 
AFP to fight the NPA and the MNLF through increasing their budget (1972: 880 million 
pesos, 1976: 4 billion pesos) and growing military aid from the U.S. (rising from 18 million to 
43 million dollars between 1970 and 1975) and increased its prerogatives through 
transferring police forces under its authority.15 He more actively engaged in questions of 
recruitment and promotion as he appointed his relatives and friends to important positions, 
especially his cousin and former bodyguard, Fabian Ver, to the position of chief of staff. Also, 
he granted his clients economic powers through the redistribution of confiscated assets. 
Through these measures, “the armed forces were no longer the servant of the state under 
martial law, but the bastion of a particular regime. Backed by his generals, Marcos wiped out 
warlord armies, closed Congress, and confiscated corporations. The president included the 
military in every aspect of authoritarian rule – censorship, repression, and governance. 
Officers became corporate managers, civil servants, local officials, and judges.” (McCoy 
1999: 192) 
 
Marcos, together with his wife Imelda, reproduced his hold on power by further demobilizing 
the opposition which during the 1970s consisted of traditional politicians, armed insurgents 
and the radicalized left. For a while, though, his rule was secure. After a first major wave of 
repression, media censorship and the installation of a new façade parliament, the 
presidential couple coopted elite segments through promotions in the vastly expanding 
bureaucracy. Further, broad parts of the population adopted a wait-and-see approach, as 
they were exhausted by the deadlock between President and Congress, the unstoppable 
corruption and open clashed between students and police forces. The new middle classes 
and professional felt particularly relieved as Marcos claimed to professionalize public service. 
                                                                                                                                                        
commercial agriculture, real estate, smuggling, money-laundering and, principally, providing votes. 
Because of Montano’s support for Macapagal in 1965, Marcos did not hesitate to undermine his 
position and support the rival Cavite faction. Sidel depicts this strategy in the following manner: 
“Constabulary campaigns against smuggling, Commission on Elections crackdowns on election 
anomalies, and congressional intrigues to undermine Montano’s influence and resources 
considerably weakened Montano’s hold on Cavite. In 1966, for example, Marcos’s allies in the 
House of Representatives launched an exposé on smuggling in Cavite, naming Lino Bocalan and 
the Montanos as the leaders of a major syndicate in the province. A carrot-and-stick courtship of 
Bocalan proceeded, with Malacañang first threatening, then rewarding, the notorious smuggling 
lord through court cases and disruption of his operations. Thus Marcos demonstrated to Bocalan 
that business as usual required direct relations with Malacañang, rendering Montano’s protection 
and brokerage services redundant.” (1999: 69) 
15 Beyond these reorganization measures, Marcos also promoted paramilitary troops, especially in 
Mindanao; see Kessler (1989: 120). In whole, Kessler concludes that “Marcos played to the 
military’s inherent factional weakness under the guise of strengthening it. The periodic claims of 
reform, reorganization, and personnel reassignments were meant not to improve the military but to 
lessen American pressure for change and to enhance his control of the military. Marcos feared that 
a strong, professional military might ultimately overthrow him, and at times he even promoted the 
idea that the military might take over in order to discourage opponents. Ironically, he was right.” 
(1989: 122) 
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Technocratic governance seemed to tackle the ravages of factionalism and the old cacique 
order.16 
 
The responses of former elite members and social groups varied profoundly during the 
following years. Traditional politicians had basically been crushed by the dismantling of 
political institutions which functioned as their sole avenues for power and patronage. 
Powerful factions were weakened from above through selective arrests and prosecutions 
(e.g. Benigno Aquino Jr., Senators Ramon Mitra and Francisco Rodrigo). The toughest 
treatment, though, was felt by the Lopez family.17 Fernando Lopez, Vice-President and close 
ally of Marcos, and his brother Eugenio, had to watch how they were stripped of their 
corporations, assets and media networks, as Marcos was holding Eugenio Lopez Jr. as 
ransom. In light of these harsh treatments that symbolized the will and the capacity of the 
ruler to break with the past, many trapos chose to give up resistance and entered the 
Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (New Society movement, KBL), the quasi-ruling party Marcos had 
established in 1978, in order to get at least some access to patronage resources and 
financial benefits.18 With patronage channels secure, the support of the AFP, the Catholic 
Church, and traditional politicians, the first national elections under martial law in 1978 
prevented the opposition forces, who were still highly visible in political discourses, even from 
exile or from jail (Aquino, Tanada, Diokno, among others), from uniting, split over the 
question whether their participation in the elections would legitimize the Marcoses, who 
would have rigged the elections anyway (cf. Thompson 1995: Chap. Four). 
 
 
4.3 Patrimonial capitalism 
 
These political transformations had direct implications for the Philippine economy which 
rapidly developed into a patrimonial order. Marcos adopted measures of rent allocation, 
predation and favoritism on a purely personal basis, which he could only accomplish given 
his aloofness from political competition. Despite his new state capacities, the Marcos regime 
degenerated into yet another symbol of Third World kleptocracy. The arbitrariness involved in 
his dealing with businessmen created a context in which even wealthy entrepreneurs and 
families could not count on the efficacy of their own personal networks and thereby extended 
high degrees of uncertainty towards those that had hitherto been able to protect their 
ventures. The sole source of capital accumulation, of creating and destroying wealth laid in 
the hands of the presidential family. Two facets of economic processes will be dealt with 
here; first, the macroeconomic and institutional changes towards export-oriented 
industrialization (EOI), and second, the concrete mechanisms of centralized corruption. 
 
The tentative shift from import substitution to EOI, which occurred in most late developing 
countries at that time, was the consequence of ideological transformations within the 
                                                 
16 “Technocratic influence increased under Marcos, in part as a result of technocrats’ links with 
international financial institutions. […] The technocrats, however, remained highly dependent on 
Marcos, and his political concerns limited the extent to which he delegated policymaking authority. 
In the end, the technocrats served Marcos by helping to hoodwink international lenders.” (Bowie & 
Unger 1997: 118). 
17 For a detailed account of the rise of the Lopez family, see McCoy (1993). 
18 On the role of ruling parties in authoritarian contexts and the difference between the Philippine and 
the Malaysian experience, see Brownlee (2007, 2008). 
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international financial institutions (IFIs) and in western donor countries, the breakdown of the 
Bretton Woods international monetary regime and the first oil price revolution of 1973/74 
which put enormous pressures on import-dependent developing countries. These institutional 
changes began with the devaluation of the peso in 1970, the same year that the Export 
Incentive Act was passed that foresaw FDI promotion measures mainly through subsidizing 
export manufacturers (tax rebates, tariff exemptions). Industrial relations were altered, 
disfavoring the working classes. Wage reductions, a ban on strikes, the founding of 
compulsory trade unions and constraints on independent ones19, countrywide exceptions to 
applying the minimum wage as well as open repression under the martial law provisions 
systematically undermined the bargaining powers of labor.20 And, the main channels to 
attract FDI were the Export Processing Zones, the first of which was established in 1972 in 
Bataan. Firms investing in these zones, which had almost no backward linkages to local 
economies and therefore cannot be regarded as competing with local manufacturing 
capitalists, were granted favorable tax exemptions, foreign exchange allocation for imports 
without having to face any restrictions concerning repatriation or labor standards (Bello, 
Kinley & Ellinson 1982). 
 
Yet, steps toward agrarian and manufacture export promotion did not solve the biggest 
problem of the Philippines, which was the deteriorating foreign debt which increased from 20 
to 26 billion dollars between 1981 and 1986 (Bello 1999). Therefore, to secure access to 
international capital markets, in 1980, the Philippines was one of the first countries worldwide 
(among others, Turkey) which experienced stricter conditionality criteria by the IFIs through 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs). From then 
on, the country was forced to institutionalize its reform measures by actively enacting import 
liberalization through tariff reductions and the lifting of import restrictions (Bowie & Unger 
1997: 116). 
 
The reform wave of the early 1980s led to serious problems of manufacturers who had until 
then only produced for the protected national market. Yet, the costs were mainly born by 
small and medium capitalists who did not have extensive ties to the political center which 
was, again, a critical resource to acquire export incentives and to arrange joint ventures with 
foreign partners, mainly MNCs. So, while local manufacturers, rural and urban workers felt 
these transformative pressures that ruined many of them (and pushing impoverished workers 
into the ranks of the NPA), big manufacturers profited disproportionately, as did agrarian 
exporters, except for the sugar industry which experienced a drastic decline in importance 
and political influence. 
 
After the reconstruction of the sugar industry and the expansion of milling capacities until the 
1970s, the sugar bloc’s influence reached its peak in 1973 and 1974 (gaining 766 million 
dollars in export revenues). Its decline was rapid and long-lasting, though. In 1974, the 
expiration of the Laurel-Langley Act and the non-extension of the Sugar Act by U.S. 
Congress ended the preferential treatment for Filipino sugar in the U.S. market and for the 
                                                 
19 5640 of 7000 registered trade unions were formally not acknowledged; see Bello, Kinley & Ellinson 
(1982: 142). 
20 Also, in the 1970s, Marcos actively promoted exporting labor through the Overseas Employment 
Development Board (OEDB) to profit from the oil price revolutions via remittances and decreasing 
unemployment (Tyner 2009: 53).  
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first time forced it to compete on the international commodity markets, causing export 
revenues to decline to 200 million dollars within the next years. The biggest hit to the sugar 
barons, though, came from Marcos’ reorganization measures of the industry. Via several 
presidential decrees, the Philippine Exchange Commission (PHILEX) was granted monopoly 
control over sugar trading and exporting (by unilaterally setting the price at which it bought 
sugar from planters and millers). And, in 1977, PHILEX was transferred from the PNB to the 
newly-created Philippine Sugar Commission (PHILSUCOM) headed by Roberto Benedicto. 
So, through fiat, Marcos monopolized the central domain of the former landed elites and 
transferred the sector’s surplus into the hands of his long-term friend and close ally who 
began “milking the sugar industry at each opportunity” (Manapat 1991: 106). Benedicto 
belonged to the inner circle of Marcos’s new cronies, he was appointed to head the PNB 
from 1966 to 1970, was ambassador in Japan (1972 to 1977) where he used his influence to 
arrange deals for himself and for Marcos. Benedicto rapidly diversified into banking 
(acquiring the Republic Planters Bank from the Ayala group), shipping, the media industry, 
proving to Imelda Marcos that he was indeed “smarter than others” (Manapat 1991; cf. 
Hawes 1987: Chap. Three). 
 
In the coconut oil industry, Marcos applied similar tactics. Contrary to the declining sugar 
sector, the coconut industry had been on the rise and developed into the main export cash 
crop until the 1970s, which was due to more favorable world market prices. Starting in 1974, 
through a wave of laws and decrees, the administration enforced a coconut levy which was 
administered by COCOFED, an association of coconut farmers and landowners to promote 
the development of the industry. The levy, however, estimated between 475 million and 575 
million dollars between 1974 and 1982, landed in the hands of the Secretary of Defense, 
Juan Ponce Enrile, and Eduardo ‘Danding’ Cojuangco. The increase of the levy and the sale 
of the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) to the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund 
gave these two cronies enormous powers over the sector. They bought up milling capacities 
(close to 80% of the sector) and outmaneuvered traditional politicians, for example, by 
forcing the Ayala Group to sell its coconut corporations Legaspi Oil and Cagayan de Oro Oil 
to the UCPB (cf. Manapat 1991; Hawes 1987: Chap. Two; Aquino 1987: 39-43). 
 
So, with the helping hand of the president, whole industries were transformed into de-facto 
monopolies and used for private gain and self-enrichment in return for being part of Marcos’ 
social support base. Examples of centralized cronyism are abundant, as figures, among 
many others, like Enrile21, Cojuangco22, Silverio23 and Disini24 entrenched themselves in all 
                                                 
21 Juan Ponce Enrile, Jr. was one of Marcos’ very early associates. Starting his business career as 
corporate lawyer after having obtained his degree at Harvard Law School, he became 
Commissioner of Customs after Marcos’ 1965 electoral victory, a position that allowed him to profit 
from abundant bribery opportunities. After a short period as Secretary of Justice, he was appointed 
Secretary of Defense and continued to secure his business interests and those of his clients and 
other Marcos cronies. While the coconut industry reorganization was certainly his biggest coup, 
Enrile presided over an economic empire ranging from agriculture, logging, banking and shipping 
(Manapat 1991: 163-205). 
22 Eduardo ‘Danding’ Cojuangco, who is the cousin of later President Corazon Aquino, belongs to a 
well-established family of hacenderos, millers and bankers. His brother Ramon also came to 
enormous riches in the Marcos years, mainly through gaining the monopoly of the Philippine Long 
Distance Telephone Co. (PLDT) through close links to the government and other dominant families 
(e.g. Yuchengco). He made excessive profits by enforcing high costs for low-quality services. 
According to Manapat, Danding “was one of Marcos’ closest and most loyal cronies” (1991: 217), 
especially as Representative of Tarlac in the 1960s. With his control over the cocnut industry, via 
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relevant economic spheres. The most successful profiteers, however, were the Marcoses 
themselves. Through a wide network of private and public funds, foundations and dummy 
businessmen, the Marcos family reaped as much as between five and ten billion dollars from 
the two decades they rules the country, thereby easily overshadowing their cronies and 
relatives (Manapat 1991: Aquino 1987). Thus, Marcos had no problems combining the needs 
of export promotion with satisfying his cronies’ and his own financial needs. Tariff 
liberalization did not pose a danger to his strategy of debt-driven growth. As Hutchcroft 
outlines, “the IMF-sponsored tariff reduction program […] was undermined in part because 
specific corporations were exempted through presidential decree; similarly, efforts to 
increase the country’s tax effort were hindered in part by tax incentives granted to Marcos’ 
associates” (Hutchcroft 1991: 433). 
 
 
4.4 Delegitimization 
 
Yet, Marcos’ patrimonial regime faced serious problems of order, which arose from the 
contradictions of debt-driven growth and the mobilization capacities of his opponents. 
Current account deficits and the huge public debt after the second oil price revolution 
curtailed the plunder did not directly curtail the plundering capacities of Marcos and his 
cronies, but they did so indirectly because more and more non-crony businessmen had to 
bear the overall costs of the growing macroeconomic imbalances. For instance, when the 
ethnic Chinese entrepreneur Dewey Dee fled the country in January 1981, leaving behind 
close to US$ 85 million in outstanding debt in a multitude of banks and investment houses, 
the whole banking system was in danger as banking regulation and supervision had been 
superseded by political connections and influence, which linked Dee to the core of Marcos’ 
cronies. To curb the damage Dee had done, state resources were needed to bail out banks, 
                                                                                                                                                        
the UCPB, Danding quickly diversified into food processing, sugar, chemicals and, to secure these 
ventures, maintained his own private army. His most valued asset, though, was the acquisition of 
San Miguel Corporation, for a long time the most profitable company of the country, by buying out 
the two dominant families, the Zobels and the Sorianos (Manapat 1991: 206-253). 
23 Ricardo Silverio is one of the only new cronies without any connection to old money. He mainly 
came to wealth through political business only, finding his way into the business elite after Marcos 
came to power. He did so through cheap government loans (e.g. for his Delta Motors Corporation), 
lack of regulatory oversight and discrimatory treatment of his rivals. Through his financial house 
Philfinance, Silverio was deeply involved in fraudulent banking activities, which led to the bank’s 
bankruptcy (with 70 million dollars in outstanding debt). Yet, the bank was bailed out and Silverio’s 
access to commercial loans was secured by the state, all the while he extracted funds from his 
companies and banks and transferred them to his real estate projects in California (Manapat 1991: 
267-273). 
24 Herminio Disini similarly profited from his connections to the Marcoses, as he was married to 
Imelda’s cousin. Before he fled the country to Austria in 1982, he led more than50 companies in 
tobacco, logging, petrochemicals, textiles, real estate, airlines and financial services. His important 
early success came with his Philippine Tobacco Filters Corporation that profited from government 
regulation disfavoring his competitors. A similar elimination took place in the field of logging in the 
Ilocos region. He was involved in many activities of graft, by getting access to investment funds 
from or through the government, the most notorious project being the nuclear power plant of 
Bataan, which has not been operative since. “Disini would first acquire firms with loans from 
foreign, government, and local private sources. He would then milk these firms and dissipate its 
assets. After bleeding the firms to the point of bankruptcy, he would turn these firms over to the 
government, which was then left holding an empty bag (Manapat 1991: 337). The massive and 
uncontrolled lending of his Interbank to Dewey Dee contributed enormously to the financial crises, 
at which he lost the goodwill of the President (Manapat 1991: 316-343). 
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and here again, “the biggest beneficiaries of the bailout had been crony-owned firms” 
(Hutchcroft 1998: 153). 
 
Marcos was increasingly estranging parts of the business community (who formed the Makati 
Business Club in 1981 to voice criticism over economic affairs), the technocrats who had less 
to say as “Marcos sat back and let the cronies run things” (Hutchcroft 1998: 167), the middle 
classes whose earnings were disappearing with rising inflation rates, groups within the AFP 
who were not content with the continuing fight against the NPA and their own politicization, 
and many traditional politicians who were excluded from patronage resources that Marcos 
allocated directly to baranguays. Yet, Marcos was still controlling political affairs and 
censoring media coverage. In 1981, he declared the end to martial law and prepared the 
1984 presidential elections which did not seem to pose a risk after the United Front of 
communists and trapos fell apart at the beginning of the 1980s (Thompson 1995: 102-109). 
 
However, Marcos himself, or Imelda who was thought to be responsible, made a big mistake 
in his dealing with his main rival, Benigno Aquino. After his prison term and his exile in the 
U.S. from where he could not directly influence the tactics of the several opposition groups, 
Aquino decided to return to the Philippines to run for President in 1984. Upon his return to on 
August 21, 1983, he was taken into custody and assassinated on the area of the Manila 
International Airport. This step caused country-wide outrage against the brutality of the 
Marcos regime and transformed Aquino into a martyr whose life story and death could be 
interpreted in the pasyon tradition. The regime for the first time faced mass demonstrations 
the biggest of which was Aquino’s funeral procession which was attended by circa two million 
demonstrators (Thompson 1995: 116). The assassination weakened patrimonial order as 
societal resistance came from a broad range of groups, the Catholic Church, more members 
of the business community, the RAM movement within the AFP and the U.S. State 
Department which developed further ties toward opposition figures. Yet, four months of 
demonstrations did not convince Marcos or receding from or sharing power. As expected, he 
won the 1984 elections through excessive fraud and coercion (348 people killed, 107 
injured), but oppositionists were able to win 60 seats (of 183) in the legislature, especially in 
urban centers where Marcos could not influence the ballot as in the countryside. Opposition 
factions used the next year to agree on a single figure to run for President in the following 
elections, and chose Corazon ‘Cory’ Aquino – at the expense of Salvador Laurel. 
 
In November 1985, Marcos announced on U.S. television the holding of snap elections in the 
Philippines on February 7, 1986. Basing his electoral strategy on money, terror and fraud, 
Marcos was not willing to experience another partial defeat as in 1984. As usual, Marcos 
assumed that the declaration of the formal results would bring him some relief and would 
further weaken the opposition. That was his final mistake. With the help of the civil society 
based NAMFREL and the Catholic Church, the opposition did not accept COMELEC and 
rather declared Cory’s moral victory over Marcos. When RAM officers staged a coup d’état 
on February 22, which was precipitated by the AFP who intended to arrest the RAM officers 
under Juan Ponce Enrile (who was at that day joined by Fidel Ramos), Cardinal Sin 
organized mass demonstrations on the Epifanio de los Santos boulevard (EDSA) which 
lasted for four days. Marcos finally resigned, after his last supporter, U.S. President Ronald 
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Reagan25, asked him to do so, and went into exile to Hawaii, while the masses of the 
peaceful EDSA revolution endorsed Cory Aquino. 
 
 
 
5. Restoring oligarchy 
 
 
As Marcos went into exile, the outcome of the transition was not clear at all. On the one 
hand, Cory Aquino gained enough social support based on her charismatic legitimacy and 
did not have to include the Communists who committed a historic mistake in boycotting the 
1986 elections (Weekley 2001). On the other hand, she had to deal with RAM officers and 
Salvador Laurel, who competed with her for the institutional outlook of the post-Marcos 
regime and the political leadership in that regime. She tried to control them by including them 
in the interim government, but coup d’état attempts in 1986 and early 1987 after the 
replacement of Enrile and Laurel showed that Cory was facing enormous challenges. Only 
as she appointed Fidel Ramos chief of staff were the links between the opposing RAM 
factions and Marcos loyalists organizationally weakened. 
 
The constitutional convention she assembled decided to reinstate the pre-Marcos political 
institutions and rules, with the only exception that presidents may serve for one term only. 
Although such amendments were intended to counter any further examples of political 
monopolization, the acceptance of the constitution and the first elections for Congress and 
municipal governors in 1987 soon led to the same constellations of influence as before 
Marcos. Accordingly, traditional political families, many of whom did not have access to 
political decision-making under the martial law regime, could re-establish their countrywide 
hold over Congress. Gutierrez’ analysis of the 1987 electoral outcome illustrates this new 
and old phenomenon. In many instances, “the clan rather than the party is the more 
dominant form of political organization in the country” (1992: 161). 
 
How did the recapturing of the political sphere by traditional families take place? First, Cory 
Aquino herself came from the Cojuangco family and displayed rather social conservative 
positions. Second, even though she gained enough popular legitimacy as the symbol of the 
People Power uprising, the precarious cooperation with the RAM officers forced her to look 
for allies among many political families to make the transition possible. Only with such 
consent-building measures among the elite did she survive the coup attempts of Enrile and 
Laurel. Third, shortly after the revolution, she was willing to negotiate peace agreements with 
the CPP-NPA and pave the way for its legal participation in the new regime, but due to the 
resistance to that attempt by Ramos and agrarian elites, she had to refrain from that strategy. 
Subsequently, the field was open to “political clans reasserting themselves as the real source 
of power in the Philippine electoral politics” (Gutierrez 1992: 160; cf. Anderson 2005). 
 
To consolidate her position, Cory publicly committed herself to undo the excessive damages 
of the martial law regime. Politically, she called for investigation into the human rights abuses 
                                                 
25 On the deteriorating relationship between the Marcoses and the U.S., mainly by reorientations 
within the State Department after the Aquino assassination, see Bonner (1987: Chap. 15) and 
Thompson (1995: 153). 
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of the AFP. However, these efforts were undermined by the RAM officers. Economically, she 
targeted the riches of the Marcoses and the corporations of their biggest cronies. Even 
before the 1987 elections, the Philippine Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) was 
established which in the following sequestered 260 companies and froze Marcos’ foreign 
bank assets. Thereby, many traditional families regained their assets, such as the Lopez 
family which re-established control over most of the companies Marcos had redistributed to 
his followers in the 1970s (especially those Eduardo Cojuangco held through the UCPB). 
Concerning the issue of land reform, the contradictions of restoring oligarchy by a popular 
leader came to the surface. Despite numerous demonstrations in Manila and Aquino’s own 
promises for land redistribution, the policy outcome, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform 
Program (CARP), was meager compared to the expectations of the rural population and 
maintained the highly unequal distribution of land ownership (Putzel 1992; Borras & Franco 
2005). 
 
Thus, we conclude that the Aquino administration re-established and consolidated oligarchic 
rule in the Philippines. Because of the absence of countervailing powers (only two leftist 
deputies in the House of Representatives), the intensification of armed struggle between the 
NPA and the AFP, the similarity of social support bases (trapos, AFP, Church), alternative 
political institutional outcomes did not materialize – and would probably not have been 
possible in light of the resistance of RAM officers to Aquino. Although Cory managed to 
arrange a rather peaceful transition (as the last of the seven coup d’état attempts occurred in 
1989), the new regime faced the same structural legitimacy problems as the pre-Marcos 
regime. In the political process, the important features until today have been the lacking 
institutionalization of political parties, the predominance of pork barrel and vote buying, the 
non-existence of ideological cleavages, continuous transgressions of institutionalized roles 
and high degrees of impunity, and political violence at election times. 
 
Only one pattern of politics was different from the post-WW II regime, namely the substantive 
fragmentation of political power structures. The earlier two-party system was replaced by a 
plurality of parties tied to prominent figures who use them as patronage machines. Internal 
rivalries prevented ideological and organizational cohesion, and the high degrees of 
members switching their allegiance to other parties or creating new ones (turncoatism), tend 
to weaken the authority of the leaders. For elections, loose patchwork coalitions are set up, 
not to form ideological blocs, but merely to mobilize patronage resources at the local levels. 
Thus, Gutierrez argues that “pork barrel […] can be considered as the single greatest 
attraction to politicians to seats of power and has been the source of funding for many a 
politician’s electoral base” (1998: 59). 
 
Finally, what characterizes the post-1986 dynamics is the institutionalized containment of the 
neopatrimonial solution. Presidents could run for one term only, and their prerogatives were 
balanced by the House of Representatives and the Senate, an institutional pattern that 
renders the success of political and economic reforms dependent on enormous side 
payments to parliament members (Eaton 2002). Thus, although this institutional containment 
of neopatrimonialism and the temporal limits to self-enrichment, graft and predation, this 
short-term hold on power induces presidents to maximize the potential gains from these 
activities (as each of them operates as a roving rather than a stationary bandit, in Olsonian 
terms) and creates enormous incentives to change the institutionalized limit. 
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Since the presidency of Aquino, every president, especially Fidel Ramos and Gloria 
Macapagal-Arroyo have invested huge patronage resources into coalition-building efforts to 
change the constitution into a parliamentary system, as they became aware of the 
‘politician’s dilemma’ (Geddes 1994) they faced. According to this scenario, Presidents who 
gain power through the usual games of patronage and personal corruption networks are 
heavily constrained by these same patterns as soon as they enter office. In fact, this 
represents the legacy of Marcos’ neopatrimonialism: the institutionalized succession of top-
elite figures who preside over fragmented state structures that renders each of these actors 
into a quasi-patrimonial ruler. What makes oligarchic rule to durable in the Philippines is the 
fact that when Joseph ‘Erap’ Estrada mobilized lower strata for his election in 1998 and the 
2001 episode of contention and succeeded in presenting himself as a populist president, this 
new repertoire met with the resistance of established elites and their civil societal 
organizations, corporations and media networks that collectively ousted him from the 
presidency and restored the usual mechanisms and deficiencies of the oligarchy (Reid 2006; 
Hedman 2005). 
 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
 
In this paper, I have highlighted the processes leading to the emergence of a neopatrimonial 
regime out of the dynamics inherent the modern Philippine oligarchy. I referred to centralizing 
dynamics in the absence of effective institutions that could have stalled the monopolization of 
power, the patrimonialization of the regime. 
 
These dynamics were realized first by Manuel Quezon who, more than his rivals, became 
aware of a new exploitable opportunity structure that came with the expansion of Filipino 
capitalists through the PNB through which he managed to capture brokerage powers 
between businessmen, urban elites, local bosses and U.S. colonial officials and elites. The 
post-independence regime introduced institutional containers (two-term limit for presidents), 
while further excluding potentially rival social groups (Democratic Alliance, Huks), which 
perpetuated the delegitimation of the regime through the continuous transgression of formal 
modes of conduct. 
 
As Quezon, it was then Marcos who led the ruling mechanisms of the oligarchy to its “logical 
conclusion” (Anderson 2005: 343) as he reaped the benefits and opportunities of heavy 
industrialization, splits within national capitalists and the increasing articulation of dissent by 
new social groups (technocrats, middle classes) and radicalizing students. Reinterpreting the 
oligarchic narrative as the main obstacle to development and democracy, Marcos 
transformed into the “supreme cacique” (ibid.) and disrupted the linkage between traditional 
elites, capitalists and their social bases. Without effective electoral competition, Marcos could 
centralize patronage resources and channels. The Martial Law regime seemed to be the only 
drastic instrument to break with the country’s past. 
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What does this case study of neopatrimonial rule, its origins and downfall tell us about the 
overall state and usefulness of the concept of neopatrimonialism? 
 
First, for the durability and legitimacy of neopatrimonial rule, the creative agency of rulers 
and opposition figures have to be taken into account (Slater 2010). Especially when election 
are relied upon without excessive despotic pre-manipulation of the process, elections can be 
transformed into newly contentious episodes in which there is the capacity for radical 
change, as it did occur in 1986. With the support of those established civil societal 
organizations that could vest legitimacy into the electoral process before Marcos (Hedman 
2006), Cory Aquino succeeded in morally contesting Marcos’ hold on power so that stolen 
elections (a feature well known in modern Filipino politics) are indeed “more than the final 
straw” (Kuntz & Thompson 2009) for the breakdown of authoritarianism. 
 
Second, the breakdown of neopatrimonial regimes usually does not lead to the establishment 
of functioning democratic institutions. How could it if the relevant transition figures are elites 
of the ancient régime? As rival social groups were further excluded from the political game 
(or chose not to participate as the CPP did in 1987), where should effective pressures for 
political change within the new old regime come from? The new institutions and their formal 
goals are in effect subverted to the re-formed “clientelist electoral regime” (Franco 2001) 
based on the competition for patronage resources as the main avenue to gain political and 
economic power. Accordingly, approaches within rational-choice transitology (Przeworksi 
1991) and the contentious politics paradigm (McAdam, Tilly & Tarrow 2001; Tilly & Tarrow 
2006) can tell us about relevant dynamics and mechanisms that erode 
authoritarian/neopatrimonial rule, but after that the historically grown structural sources of 
regimes come to the fore again which determine where the transition path leads to. 
 
Related to the second point is the issue of state power and the state-regime linkage. Based 
on the works of Mann (1984), Weiss & Hobson (1995) and Ertman (1997), we can state that 
neopatrimonial regimes and practices do seldom come with a powerful state apparatus. 
While they rank high in despotic power, they tend to lack infrastructural power (at least when 
compared to more cohesive forms of authoritarianism or democratic countries). This results 
from the divergence between the patrimonial and legal-rational elements of neopatrimonial 
rule which generally prevents a systemic intertwining of state and societal forces through 
which social relations can be successfully altered. Given the lack of infrastructural power 
(and institutional trust) in neopatrimonial regimes, it cannot be expected that its erosion and 
the introduction of democratic institutions will increase the state’s infrastructural power. 
Instead, they create enormous incentives for post-transition actors and groups to reproduce 
state institutions as mere patronage resources. In the case of the Philippines, the political 
fragmentation in the post-Marcos regime has contributed to a substantive decrease of 
political certainty, both for political elites and societal groups. This ‘politician’s dilemma’ 
induces each Post-Marcos president to attempt to alter the institutional framework in order to 
overcome the one-term presidency limit and, at the same time, to plunder the state as rapid 
as possible, both for private reasons and in order to sustain precarious social support bases. 
However, so far, no one, not even Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo who seemed to strain the limits 
of the new institutions as none did before her except Marcos (Hutchcroft 2008, Quimpo 
2009), managed to re-form an authoritarian, i.e. a new neopatrimonial regime, in the 
Philippines.  
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To conclude, neopatrimonialism is still a valid concept through which to analyze and properly 
understand political processes in many late developing countries. Although we can assume 
that there exists a variety of pathways toward neopatrimonial rule, it is essential to bear in 
mind the Philippine pathway out of the centralizing dynamics inherent in the oligarchic 
regime. In fact, the Philippines represent an interesting case for comparative research. For 
example, what differentiates Marcos’ ‘New Society’ from Suharto’s ‘New Order’ is that the 
latter began ruling within a military junta which later evolved into a distinctive neopatrimonial 
regime which may explain why Suharto ruled longer than Marcos (Slater 2010). Contrary to 
that, a comparison with the Arab varieties of neopatrimonialism may highlight the structural 
sources of delegitimation in these anciens régimes, the predominant contemporary conflict 
structures and the ideological repertoires rulers rely upon to stabilize their rule. 
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